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This paper builds a theory of pro￿t sharing between two ￿rms in a duopoly
market through which ￿rms seek to increase their pro￿ts and, in turn, to limit
the competition. We use a general model to show the direct (negative) and
indirect (positive) e⁄ects of this strategy. We then focus on some oligopolistic
models to analyze more deeply and more precisely these two opposite e⁄ects
in search of the dominant one.
We thus show that giving away pro￿ts is a rewarding strategy for ￿rms in
some (but not all) models of oligopolistic competition.
Keywords: Pro￿t sharing, Oligopoly, Collusion, Competition, Psychology
and economics.
JEL Classi￿cation: A12, C72, D21, L13.1 Introduction
The problem of ￿rms in oligopoly situation has always attracted at-
tention from economists. As attests the huge literature on the models of
Cournot, Bertrand and the like. In recent years, this type of model has been
applied to a wide range of economic issues such as industrial organisation,
macroeconomics, public economics and international trade.
However, most of the economists emphasizes the ￿rms￿classical strate-
gies. Some for example using the Cournot model or a variant describe ￿rms
as competing in quantities. Others using the Bertrand model or a similar
present ￿rms as competing in prices. Several consider a combination of these
two models. Many using a Stackelberg model introduce the notion of timing
in the way ￿rms are competing in the markets. Finally, some recent econo-
mists (Kemplerer and Meyer (86), Fudenberg and Tirole (83), Vives (84, 90),
Kihlstrom and Vives (89), Jun and Vives (2004)) introduce some grains of
sand into those well-known models by pointing the role of uncertainty, the
role of information and the role of experience in the behavior of ￿rms1.
The present paper, by contrast focuses on a particular strategy of ￿rms
in a duopoly situation, which until now has surprisingly received very little
attention in economics2. It corresponds to the fact that each ￿rm decides
unilaterally to cede voluntarily a part of its pro￿t to its rival. Thus, ￿rms
￿rst (in the ￿rst stage) decide simultaneously the optimal part of their pro￿ts
to give away to their rivals and then (in the second stage) determine the
equilibrium price. The rationale of the "unilateral-decision" assumption is
to support the legality of this strategy. Consequently, our ￿rms should not
be treated as a cartel or as colluding ￿rms or as joint ventures3.
We develop a theory of pro￿t sharing between two ￿rms in a duopoly
market through which ￿rms seek to increase their pro￿ts and, in turn, to
limit the competition. We use a general model to show the direct (negative)
and indirect (positive) e⁄ects of this strategy. We then specialize on some
oligopolistic models (Cournot, Bertrand, Hotelling) with two-stage game and
linear demand to analyze more deeply these two e⁄ects in quest of the dom-
inant one. We thus show that giving away pro￿ts is a rewarding strategy for
￿rms in some of (but not all) the above oligopolistic competition models. For
instance, ￿rms are better o⁄ to share pro￿ts when markets are di⁄erentiated
1The terms "grains of sand" is borrowed from Benabou-Tirole (2001).
2This idea has received much greater emphasis in psychology. For instance, many
psychologists have always encouraged to share because of the positive e⁄ect on the human
well-being.
3In a companion paper (Waddle 2005d), we will totally relax this assumption allowing
￿rms to invest (rather than to share) a portion of their pro￿ts in a joint venture.
1whether by location or by demand function. Conversely, ￿rms have no incen-
tive to cede pro￿ts when goods are homogeneous like in the classical Cournot
model. Indeed, this is the main di⁄erence with those oligopolistic models.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 relates our work to the existing
literature. Section 3 builds the basic model of pro￿t sharing between two
￿rms in a duopoly market. Section 4 focuses on the classical Cournot model
and points out that it is worthless for ￿rms to give away pro￿ts. Section
5 moves to the Cournot model with heterogenoeous goods and thus shows
that ￿rms win by giving away pro￿ts. Section 6 turns to the Hotelling model
where goods are di⁄erentiated by location and comes to the same conclusion
of the previous section. Finally, section 7 explores the Bertrand model with
heterogeneous goods and, as in the two previous sections, brings to light that
sharing pro￿ts is a rewarding strategy for ￿rms. Section 8 concludes with
suggestions for future research. Details of proofs are gathered in appendix.
2 Review of the literature
Our paper is connected to three lines of research in the oligopoly theory:
partial ownership, competition and collusion.
Partial Ownership. Some economists have recently integrated into their
model the notion of partial ownership in the strategies of ￿rms in an oligopoly
situation.
Malhueg (92) shows that if ￿rms interact repeatedly, increasing cross own-
ership may reduce the likelihood of collusion. A high level of cross ownership
may even entail a lower likelihood of collusion than would no cross ownership.
We di⁄er from this article in two respects: First, Malhueg￿ s paper considers
that each ￿rm is entitled to a common fraction of the pro￿t earned by the
other ￿rm. Here, we consider that each ￿rm voluntarily gives up a part of its
pro￿t to the other ￿rm. In others terms, each ￿rm behaves as if it unilaterally
ceded a share of its pro￿t to its rival. Second, our objective is just di⁄erent.
Malhueg investigates wether increasing cross ownership among rivals increase
the likelihood of collusion while we examine whether a ￿rm is better o⁄ by
sharing its pro￿t to its rival in two di⁄erent situations. We don￿ t pose the
problem of collusion which rather is exogenous to our model.
Farell and Shapiro (90) studies a one-way cross-ownership where a big
￿rm wants to acquire assets from an other ￿rm. Through a single-period
Cournot oligopoly model, they show that, as the degree of cross ownership
2among rivals increases, the equilibrium in the market become less compet-
itive in the sense that aggregate output falls towards the monopoly level.
However, there are two di⁄erences with our model. First, we employ a two-
stage game to analyze the pro￿tability of sharing pro￿t between two ￿rms
in a duopoly situation. In other terms, we investigate in which conditions
￿rms are better o⁄ to share pro￿ts. We are not concerned by the e⁄ects of
increased cross ownership on the competition. At least, the impact on the
competition is internalized in our model. Another key di⁄erence is that it is
always pro￿table for our ￿rms to share pro￿ts when competing in prices.
Caminal and Vives (96) considers a duopoly market where in which con-
sumers have heterogeneous information about one good quality. Their arti-
cle sustains that the market tends to become more competitive if consumers
compete for markets shares beyond the level explained by short-run pro￿t
maximization. Here, in contrast, competition has not always increased. Be-
sides, we do not have any information problem. On the contrary, our ￿rms
are well informed.
Finally, FritzRoy and Kraft (86) exhibits strong e⁄ects of pro￿t-sharing
and worker ownership shares on residual owners￿return on capital. Although
we both analyze the impact of pro￿t-sharing on the pro￿tability, we di⁄er
from our targets. Their model is applied to organisation while ours is ￿rms
oriented. Furthermore, we don￿ t always have strong e⁄ects.
Collusion. The other literature to which our paper belongs to is the one
on collusion between oligopoly models.
Brock and Scheinkman (85) investigates the role of industry capacity in
enforcing collusion in the context of repeated games. Their article shows
that a variation in the number of ￿rms induces a non-monotone e⁄ect on the
best enforceable price. The distinctive feature of our work is that our ￿rms
are not capacity constrainted. We do not analyze the impact of a deviating
￿rm on the cartel. On the contrary, in our model ￿rms do not form a cartel
and do not even collude. Of course, the results of our model show eventual
consequences on collusion.
Salant et al. (83) points out that some exogeneous mergers may decrease
the endogeneous joint pro￿ts of colluding ￿rms. Our model shares with Salant
et al. (83) a concern with the impact on the other ￿rms￿pro￿ts though our
impact was targeted at each ￿rm￿pro￿t. However, we do not consider ￿rms
in a merging situation.
Competition. Our work is also related to competition in oligopoly models.
More speci￿cally, a line of research has emphasized di⁄erent strategies for
￿rms competing in oligopoly markets.
3For instance, Singh and Vives (84) proves that ￿rms must choose either
the quantity contract in case of goods substitutes or the price contract in case
of goods complements. Contrary to Singh and Vives, we are not interested to
know in which case ￿rms are better o⁄ to use prices as dominant strategies
and in which one they should use quantities. Rather, we seek to elucidate the
impact of sharing pro￿ts strategy on ￿rms￿pro￿ts when competing in prices.
Likewise, Bulow et al. (85) studies a situation similar except that it
considers two markets and emphasizes how a ￿rm￿ s action in one market can
change competitors￿strategies in the second market. It investigates under
what conditions the action might provide costs or bene￿ts in that second
market. This paper and ours share the basic objective of deriving the impact
of a ￿rm￿ s action on the other ￿rms. However, our ￿rms￿strategies are
di⁄erent. They are not involved in underinvesting in capital to reduce the
ferocity of future competition. They simply share a part of their pro￿ts to
their rivals. Moreover, we do consider only one market where the timing is
super￿ uous.
Reynolds and Snapp (86) shows that in markets entry is di¢ cult, partial
ownership arrangements could result in less output and higher prices than
otherwise, even if the ownership shares are relatively small. There are two
di⁄erences with our model. The ￿rst one is free-entry in our model. The
second one is our ￿rms do not form a cartel and nor involved in any partial
ownership arrangements in the sense of Reynolds and Snapp. Furthermore,
pro￿ts have not always increased.
Finally, Klemperer and Meyer (86) points out the role of uncertainty
in the choice of strategic variables (prices, quantities). This uncertainty
problem absent in our model gives ￿rms strict preferences between setting
price and quantity. There are also other signi￿cant di⁄erences between our
models. First, we consider a two-stage game where ￿rms are competing in a
duopoly market. Second, ￿rms use the same strategic variables (price, price)
or (quantity,quantity).
3 The basic model
Consider two ￿rms 1 and 2 in a duopoly market with s1 and s2 their
two respective variables of strategy. As we will see later, these variables
can be prices or quantities. Let ￿1 (resp. ￿2) denote the part of the pro￿t
that ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm 2) wants to share with ￿rm 2 (resp. ￿rm 1). With-
out loss of generality, we suppose that ￿i 2 [0;1]. Finally, assume that
the respective pro￿t functions of the two ￿rms ￿1(s1(￿1;￿2);s2(￿1;￿2)) and
4￿2(s1(￿1;￿2);s2(￿1;￿2)) (hereafter ￿1 (s1, s2) and ￿1 (s1, s2)) are strictly
positive. For simplicity, we will also assume that ￿1(s1;s2) and ￿2(s1;s2)
are strictly concave in ￿1 and ￿2 and that the functions s1(:) and s2(:) are
di⁄erentiable.
We consider a two-stage game whose sequences are later de￿ned. In the
￿rst stage of the game, ￿rms are searching which ￿i maximizes their pro￿t.
In the second stage of the game, ￿rms are seeking out si that maximizes their
pro￿ts. We solve the problem by backwards induction.
Second stage of game
Let us write each ￿rms￿ s maximisation problem:
Maxs1 P1(s1(￿1;￿2);s2(￿1;￿2)) = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1(s1(￿1;￿2);s2(￿1;￿2)) +
￿2￿2(s1(￿1;￿2);s2(￿1;￿2))
Maxs2 P2(s1(￿1;￿2);s2(￿1;￿2)) = (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2(s1(￿1;￿2);s2(￿1;￿2)) +
￿1￿1(s1(￿1;￿2);s2(￿1;￿2))




































These last two equations de￿ne implicitly s￿
1(￿1;￿2) and s￿
2(￿1;￿2). From
where, we can write the reduced-formpro￿t function P1(s￿
1(￿1;￿2); s￿
2(￿1;￿2))
that we use to solve the ￿rst stage of the game.
First stage of the game





























Now, we can write the ￿rst-order conditions for the ￿rm 1 in the ￿rst
stage of the game. For that, we derive P1(s￿
1(￿1;￿2);s￿
2(￿1;￿2)) (henceforth
P1) with respect to ￿1 by applying the chain rule and we get:
@P1





















































and by rearranging, we have:
@P1













































By checking that the terms in the ￿rst bracket of the two equations are
equal to zero from (1) and (2) and by developing the terms in the second
bracket, we have:
@P1

























Finally, by using the equations (3) and (4), we can write:
@P1




































The equations (5) and (6) give ￿￿
1 and ￿￿
2
Proposition 1 In the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE), ￿￿
1 and ￿￿
2 are
given by (5) and (6) respectively where the terms s￿
1;s￿
2 are the implicit solu-
tions to (3) and (4).





2 can be easily found by solving the equations
(5) and (6).
Note that:




This suggests that ￿rms are willing to give away pro￿ts (fact that the
literature has surprisingly, until now, ignored). For instance, in the next
sections, we will show examples of interior solutions where ￿rms are even
better o⁄ by sharing pro￿ts.
i)
@Pi








where ￿i 2 [0;1] & i; j = 1;2 (i 6= j)
This insinuates that sharing pro￿ts between ￿rms has two opposite e⁄ects.
First, a direct or negative e⁄ect given by the ￿rs term ￿￿i and then, a









the total e⁄ect is crucial when ￿rms decide whether or not to give away
pro￿ts to their rivals.
As we will see in the next sections, this e⁄ect is not always positive. For
instance, in a homogenoeus market, we found it negative when ￿rms compete
in quantities4, but positive when ￿rms compete in prices.
4This article analyzes only quantity competition in an homogeneous market whereas a
companion article Pro￿t Sharing Between Firms: II. The Bertrand Model (Waddle 2005b)
focuses essentially on price competition.
74 The classical Cournot model
In the last section, we have seen intuitively that it is possible for ￿rms
to give away pro￿ts and that depended on whether or the total e⁄ect of this
strategy was positive. In this section, we will show that it is not pro￿table
for ￿rms to share pro￿ts when competing in quantities.
For that, we consider two ￿rms 1 and 2 in a homogeneous market. We
suppose that the marginal cost of production c is, without loss of generality,
0. Let the demand curve be D(p) = 1 ￿ p or p = P(q1 + q2) = 1 ￿ q1 ￿ q2
where q1 (resp. q2) are ￿rm 1￿ s (resp. ￿rm 2￿ s) output. Assume that the
pro￿t of the two ￿rms ￿1(q1;q2) and ￿2(q1;q2) are concave in qi (i = 1;2).
Now, let us introduce a grain of novelty in the basic Cournot model. Let
￿1 (resp. ￿2) denote the part of the pro￿t that ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm 2) wants to
share with ￿rm 2 (resp. ￿rm 1). We suppose that ￿i 2 [0;1]. Consequently,
we can write the new pro￿t function Pi(qi(￿i;￿j);qj(￿i;￿j)) (hereafter Pi)
of each ￿rm as:
Pi = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i(qi(￿i;￿j);qj(￿i;￿j) + ￿j￿j(qi(￿i;￿j);qj(￿i;￿j))
We consider a two-stage game whose sequences are thus de￿ned. In the
￿rst stage of the game, ￿rms choose ￿i. In the second stage of the game,
￿rms select pi.
In the ￿rst stage of the game, for ￿1 and ￿2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Maxa1 P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 + ￿2￿2
Max￿2 P2 = (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 + ￿1￿1
In the second stage of the game, for q1 and q2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Maxq1 P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 + ￿2￿2
Maxq2 P2 = (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 + ￿1￿1
84.1 Solving the second-stage of the game
To ￿nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), we begin by solving
subgames in the second-stage. Recall that, in the second stage, ￿rms are
looking for prices that maximizes their pro￿ts.
Proposition 2 If ￿i 2 [0;1], then any quantities (q￿
1, q￿






3￿￿1￿￿2constitute a NE in the second stage of the
game.
Proof. To see that, it su¢ ces to solve the game backwards.
Second stage of the game
Maxq1P1(q1;q2) = (1 ￿ ￿1)pq1 + ￿2pq2
or Maxq1 P1(q1;q2) = (1￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ q1 ￿ q2)q1+ ￿2(1 ￿ q1 ￿ q2)q2
The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to q1 give:




















3 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2
(8)
Conclusion: If ￿i 2 [0;1], then (q￿
1, q￿
2) satisfying equations (7) & (8)
constitute a NE in the second stage of the game.
The second-stage being entirely solved and NE being found, we can thus
move to the ￿rst-stage of the game in order to ￿nd SPNE
5Note that:
i) If ￿1 = ￿2 = 0 we have: q￿
1 = q￿
2 = 1
3 and P1 = P2 = 1
9 (Cournot0s case)
ii) If ￿1 = ￿2 = 1
2 we have: q￿
1 = q￿
2 = 1
2 and P1 = P2 = 1
2 (Monopoly0s case)
94.2 Solving the ￿rst-stage of the game
In the ￿rst-stage of the game, ￿rms choose the ￿i optimal maximizing their
pro￿ts to share with their rivals.
Solving backwards, we have solved the second-stage of the game in the







3￿￿1￿￿2 if ￿i 2 [0;1]






3 ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿2
(9)
Using equations (7) ￿ (9), we can rewrite the pro￿t function :






Now, in the current section, we draw our attention to the ￿rst-stage of
the game searching for SPNE in ￿i.
Proposition 3 (￿1, ￿2) : ￿￿




3 if ￿i 2 [0;1]
are SPNE of the game. Besides, pro￿ts in the SPNE decreases with ￿i making
it worthless for ￿rms to give away pro￿ts.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. It su¢ ces to solve the rest of the
game.

















@￿1 = 0 ) ￿1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2 = 0 ) ￿1 = ￿1 + ￿2
10By solving the above equation, we ￿nd ￿￿
1 = 0








Likewise, one can check that:
@P1
@￿1 < 0
Conclusion: (￿1, ￿2) : ￿￿




3 if ￿i 2 [0;1]
are SPNE of the game. Besides, pro￿ts in the SPNE decreases with ￿i making
it worthless for ￿rms to give away pro￿ts.
In the next section, we will turn to the Cournot model but with di⁄eren-
tiated markets. Interestingly, we will show that sharing pro￿ts is a rewarding
strategy for ￿rms.
5 The Cournot model with heterogeneous goods
In this section, we consider a model similar as the one described in the
previous section except that we introduce the heterogeneity in the market.
We thus consider two ￿rms 1 and 2 in a heterogeneous market. The
marginal cost of production c is, without loss of generality, 0. We still assume
that the pro￿t of the two ￿rms ￿1(q1;q2) and ￿2(q1;q2) are concave in qi (i =
1;2).
Without loss of generality, we suppose that ￿i 2 [0;1], i = 1;2. Let
p1 = 1 ￿ q1 ￿ ￿q2 and p2 = 1 ￿ ￿q1 ￿ q2 the respective inverse demand
functions of ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2 where q1(resp. q2) are ￿rm 1￿ s (resp. ￿rm 2￿ s)
output.
As before, we introduce a grain of novelty in this Cournot model (with
heterogeneous goods). Let ￿1 (resp. ￿2) denote the part of the pro￿t that
￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm 2) wants to share with ￿rm 2 (resp. ￿rm 1). We sup-
pose that ￿i 2 [0;1]. Consequently, we can write the new pro￿t function
Pi(qi(￿i;￿j);qj(￿i;￿j)) (hereafter Pi) of each ￿rm as:
Pi = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i(qi(￿i;￿j);qj(￿i;￿j) + ￿j￿j(qi(￿i;￿j);qj(￿i;￿j))
We consider a two-stage game whose sequences are thus de￿ned. In the
￿rst stage of the game, ￿rms choose ￿i. In the second stage of the game,
￿rms select pi.
In the ￿rst stage of the game, for ￿1 and ￿2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
11Maxa1 P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 + ￿2￿2
Max￿2 P2 = (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 + ￿1￿1
In the second stage of the game, for q1 and q2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Maxq1 P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 + ￿2￿2
Maxq2 P2 = (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 + ￿1￿1
5.1 Solving the second-stage of the game
To ￿nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), we begin by solving
subgames in the second-stage. Recall that, in the second stage, ￿rms are
looking for prices that maximizes their pro￿ts.










constitute a NE in the second stage of the game.
Proof. To see that, it su¢ ces to solve the game backwards.
Second stage of the game
Maxq1P1(q1;q2) = (1 ￿ ￿1)pq1 + ￿2pq2
or Maxq1 P1(q1;q2) = (1￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ q1 ￿ ￿q2)q1+ ￿2(1 ￿ ￿q1 ￿ q2)q2
The ￿rst-order conditions with respct to q1 give:
@P1












(1 ￿ ￿2)(2(1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2))






(1 ￿ ￿1)(2(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1))
4(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1)
(11)
Conclusion: If ￿i 2 [0;1] & ￿1+￿2 6= 1, then (q￿
1, q￿
2) satisfying equations
(10) & (11) constitute a NE in the second stage of the game.
The second-stage being entirely solved and NE being found, we can thus
move to the ￿rst-stage of the game in order to ￿nd SPNE
5.2 Solving the ￿rst-stage of the game
In the ￿rst-stage of the game, ￿rms choose the ￿i optimal maximizing
their pro￿ts to share with their rivals.
Solving backwards, we have solved the second-stage of the game in the








4(1￿￿1)(1￿￿2)￿(1￿￿1+￿2)(1￿￿2+￿1) if ￿i 2 [0;1] & ￿1 + ￿2 6= 1
Since p￿
1 = 1 ￿ q￿
1 ￿ ￿q￿
2 and p￿













Using equations (10) ￿ (13), we can rewrite the pro￿t function:





Now, in the current section, we draw our attention to the ￿rst-stage of
the game searching for SPNE in ￿i.
6We can easily check that if ￿ = 1, we obtain the same result already found in the
previous section with homogeneous product, that is, q1(a1;a2) =
(1￿a2)
(3￿a1￿a2)
13Proposition 5 For ￿ = ￿1, (￿1, ￿2) : ￿￿
i = 0:45; (q1, q2) : q￿
1 = q￿
2 ￿ 5:5
if ￿i 2 [0;1] are SPNE of the game. Besides, pro￿ts in the SPNE is by far
higher than in the case where ￿1 = ￿2 = 0, making it worthwile for ￿rms to
share pro￿ts.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. It su¢ ces to solve the rest of the
game.
First-stage of the game









The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to ￿1 give:
@P1
@￿1 = 0




By solving the above equation, we ￿nd: ￿￿ = 45% and ￿ = ￿1
By replacing ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿ in the pro￿t function, we have:
P
￿







4(1￿￿)2￿￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2￿2￿￿￿
4(1￿￿)2￿1
Finally, substituing ￿￿ = 0:45 and ￿ = ￿1 in the above equation and in
equation (10)&(11) we ￿nd P ￿
1 = 5:5 and q￿
1 = q￿
2 = 5:5
However, if ￿rms decide not to share their pro￿ts, that is, ￿￿ = 0 and
￿ = ￿1, we ￿nd P1 = 1
Conclusion: For ￿ = ￿1, (￿1, ￿2) : ￿￿
i = 0:45; (q1, q2) : q￿
1 = q￿
2 ￿ 5:5 if
￿i 2 [0;1] are SPNE of the game. Pro￿ts in the SPNE are thus by far higher
than in the case where ￿1 = ￿2 = 0, making it worthwile for ￿rms to share
pro￿ts.
In the next section, we will turn to a Hotelling model where goods are
di⁄erentiated by location. As before, we will show that sharing pro￿ts is a
winning strategy for ￿rms.
146 The Hotelling model
In this section, we consider a model similar as the one described in the
previous section except that goods are di⁄erentiated by location.
For that, consider a model in which a linear city of length 1 lies on the
abscissa of a line and consumers are uniformly distributed with density 1
along this interval. There are two ￿rms which sell the same physical good.
For simplicity, these two ￿rms are located at the extremes7 of the city; ￿rm
1 at x = 0 and ￿rm 2 at x = 1.
Consumers incur a transportation cost t (t > 0) per unit of length (this
cost may include the value of time spent in travel). Thus, a consumer living
at x incurs a cost of tx to go to ￿rm 1 and a cost of t(1 ￿ x) to go to ￿rm
2. Consumers have unit demands; that is, each consumes one or zero unit of
the good. Each consumer derives a surplus from consumption (gross of price
and transportation costs) equal to s
We take the ￿rms￿location as given and look for the Nash equilibrium in
prices. Assuming that ￿rms choose their prices p1 and p2 simultaneously, we
derive the demand function for linear transportation costs. A consumer who
is indi⁄erent between the two ￿rms is located at x = D1(p1;p2) , where x is
given by equating generalized costs; i.e.,
p1 + tx = p2 + t(1 ￿ x)
The ￿rms￿respective demand are:








Firms￿pro￿t functions can thus be written as:
￿1 = p1D1 (p1;p2)
￿2 = p2D2 (p1;p2)
7One can easily check that the results do not change if ￿rms are located symmetrically
anywhere in the linear city as long as the transportation cost is linear.
15We will consider a variant of this model in which ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm 2) de-
cides unilaterally and voluntarily to share a part of ￿1 (resp. ￿2) of its pro￿t
with ￿rm 2 (resp.￿rm1). We suppose that ￿i 2 [0;1], i = 1;2, (i 6= j). Conse-
quently, we can write the new pro￿t function Pi(pi(￿i;￿j);pj(￿i;￿j)) (hereafter
Pi) of each ￿rm as:
Pi = (1 ￿ ￿i)piDi(pi(￿i;￿j);pj(￿i;￿j) + ￿jpjDj(pi(￿i;￿j);pj(￿i;￿j))
As in the previous section, we look at a two-stage game. In the ￿rst stage
of the game, each ￿rm simultaneously chooses ￿i optimum to share with its
rival. In the second stage, each one simultaneously chooses the price pi to
charge given the price pj (the part ￿j of the pro￿t) charged (o⁄ered) by its
rival and also the part ￿i of the pro￿t it itself gives away. As usual, we solve
backwards to ￿nd the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
6.1 Solving the second-stage of the game
To ￿nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), we begin by solving
subgames in the second-stage. Recall that, in the second stage, ￿rms are
looking for prices that maximizes their pro￿ts.




1(￿1;￿2) = t(1 ￿ ￿2)
3￿3￿1+￿2
(1￿￿1￿￿2)(3￿￿1￿￿2) & p￿
2(:;:) = t(1 ￿ ￿1)
3￿3￿2+￿1
(1￿￿1￿￿2)(3￿￿1￿￿2)
constitute a NE in the second stage of the game.
Proof. To see that, it su¢ ces to solve the game backwards.
Second stage of the game
Maxp1 P1(p1;p2) = (1 ￿ ￿1)p1D1(p1;p2) + ￿2p2D2(p1;p2)
or Maxp1 P1(p1;p2) = (1 ￿ ￿1)p1(1
2 +
p2￿p1




The ￿rst-order conditions with respct to p1 give:
@P1



















16By solving the system of the last two previous equations, we have:
p
￿






2(￿1;￿2) = t(1 ￿ ￿1)
3￿3￿2+￿1
(1￿￿1￿￿2)(3￿￿1￿￿2) (15)
Conclusion: If ￿i 2 [0;1] & ￿1+￿2 6= 1, then (p￿
1, p￿
2) satisfying equations
(14) & (15) constitute a NE in the second stage of the game.
6.2 Solving the ￿rst-stage of the game
In the ￿rst-stage of the game, ￿rms choose the ￿i optimal maximizing their
pro￿ts to share with their rivals.
Solving backwards, we have solved the second-stage of the game in the
previous section and have found NE in prices summarized below:
p￿




2(￿1;￿2) = t(1 ￿ ￿1)
3￿3￿2+￿1
(1￿￿1￿￿2)(3￿￿1￿￿2) if ￿i 2 [0;1] & ￿1 + ￿2 6= 1
Since D1(p1;p2) = x = 1
2 +
p2￿p1






































2 ￿ 3￿2 + 12￿1￿2 ￿ 2￿
2
1￿2 + 9 ￿ 9￿1
￿
Now, in the current section, we draw our attention to the ￿rst-stage of
the game searching for SPNE in ￿i.
Proposition 7 For t > 0, (￿1, ￿2) : ￿￿
i = 0:15; (p1, p2) : p￿
1 ￿ 1:2 t and
p￿
2 ￿ 1:2 t if ￿i 2 [0;1] are SPNE of the game. Besides, pro￿ts in the SPNE
is 20% t higher than in the case where ￿1 = ￿2 = 0, making it rewarding for
￿rms to share pro￿ts.
17Proof. The proof is straightforward. It su¢ ces to solve the rest of the
game.
First-stage of the game













The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to ￿1 give:
@P1
@￿1 = 0




2 (4￿3 ￿ 10￿2 + 8￿ ￿ 1) t
(2￿￿1)2(2￿￿3) = 0
By solving the above equation, we ￿nd: ￿￿ = 0:15











Finally, replacing ￿￿ = 0:15 in the above equation and equations (14)&(15),
we ￿nd P ￿
1 = 0:60 t and p￿
1 = p￿
2 = 1:2 t
However, if ￿rms decide not to share their pro￿ts, that is, ￿￿ = 0, we ￿nd
P ￿
1 = 0:50 t
Conclusion: For t > 0, (￿1, ￿2) : ￿￿
i = 0:15; (p1, p2) : p￿
1 ￿ 1:2 t and
p￿
2 ￿ 1:2 t if ￿i 2 [0;1] are SPNE of the game. Besides, pro￿ts in the SPNE
is 20% t higher than in the case where ￿1 = ￿2 = 0, making it rewarding for
￿rms to share pro￿ts.
7 The Bertrand model with heterogenous goods
In this section, we study a problem similar to the one described in section
5, introducing the heterogeneity in the market. The only di⁄erence is that
the strategic variable is now price. The latter matches with the case of direct
demand which we are, here, interested to.
We consider two ￿rms 1 and 2 in a heterogeneous market. We suppose
that the marginal cost of production c is, without loss of generality, 0. Let
p1 = 1￿q1￿￿q2 and p2 = 1￿￿q1￿q2 the respective inverse demand functions
18of ￿rm 1 and ￿rm 2 where q1(resp. q2) are ￿rm 1￿ s (resp. ￿rm 2￿ s) output.
So, their respective demand functions are q1 = 1
1￿￿2(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p1 + ￿p2) and
q2 = 1
1￿￿2(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p2 + ￿p1). Finally, assume that the pro￿t of the two ￿rms
￿1(q1;q2) = p1q1 and ￿2(q1;q2) = p2q2 are concave in qi (i = 1;2).
As before, we introduce a grain of novelty in this sort of Bertrand model
(with heterogeneous goods). Let ￿1 (resp. ￿2) denote the part of the pro￿t
that ￿rm 1 (resp. ￿rm 2) wants to share with ￿rm 2 (resp. ￿rm 1). We
suppose that ￿i 2 [0;1], i = 1;2 (i 6= j). Consequently, we can write the new
pro￿t function Pi(qi(￿i;￿j);qj(￿i;￿j)) (hereafter Pi) of each ￿rm as:
Pi = (1 ￿ ￿i)￿i(qi(￿i;￿j);qj(￿i;￿j) + ￿j￿j(qi(￿i;￿j);qj(￿i;￿j))
We consider a two-stage game whose sequences are thus de￿ned. In the
￿rst stage of the game, ￿rms choose ￿i. In the second stage of the game,
￿rms select pi.
In the ￿rst stage of the game, for ￿1 and ￿2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Maxa1 P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 + ￿2￿2
Max￿2 P2 = (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 + ￿1￿1
In the second stage of game, for p1 and p2 ￿rms simultaneously solve:
Maxp1 P1 = (1 ￿ ￿1)￿1 + ￿2￿2
Maxp2 P2 = (1 ￿ ￿2)￿2 + ￿1￿1
7.1 Solving the second-stage of the game
To ￿nd the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), we begin by solving
subgames in the second-stage. Recall that, in the second stage, ￿rms are
looking for prices that maximizes their pro￿ts.










[4(1￿￿1)(1￿￿2)￿￿2(1￿￿1+￿2)(1￿￿2+￿1)] constitute a NE in the sec-
ond stage of the game.
19Proof. To see that, it su¢ ces to solve the game backwards.
Second stage of the game
Maxp1 P1(p1;p2) = (1 ￿ ￿1)pq1 + ￿2pq2 (18)
or Maxp1 P1(p1;p2) = 1
1￿￿2 [(1 ￿ ￿1)p1(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p1 + ￿p2) + ￿2p2(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p2 + ￿p1)]
The ￿rst-order conditions with respct to q1 give:
@P1
















(1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿)[2(1 ￿ ￿1) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)]






(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿)[2(1 ￿ ￿2) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1)]
[4(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2(1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1)]
(20)
Conclusion: If ￿i 2 [0;1] & ￿1+￿2 6= 1, then any prices (p￿
1, p￿
2) satisfying
equations (19) & (20) constitute a NE in the second stage of the game.
The second-stage being entirely solved and NE being found, we can thus
move to the ￿rst-stage of the game in order to ￿nd SPNE
7.2 Solving the ￿rst-stage of the game
In the ￿rst-stage of the game, ￿rms choose the ￿i optimal maximizing
their pro￿ts to share with their rivals.
Solving backwards, we have solved the second-stage of the game in the
































Using equations (19) ￿ (22), we can rewrite the pro￿t function8:





Now, in the current section, we draw our attention to the ￿rst-stage of
the game searching for SPNE in ￿i.
Proposition 9 For ￿ ￿ ￿1, (￿1, ￿2) : ￿￿




if ￿i 2 [0;1] are SPNE of the game. Besides, pro￿ts in the SPNE is 12%
higher than in the case where ￿1 = ￿2 = 0, making it rewarding for ￿rms to
share pro￿ts.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. It su¢ ces to solve the rest of the
game.
First-stage of the game









The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to ￿1 give:
@P1
@￿1 = 0
At the equilibrium we have ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿: )
@P1
@￿1c￿1=￿2=￿ = 0
By solving the above equation, we ￿nd: ￿￿ = 0:43 and ￿ ￿ ￿1
By replacing ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿ in the pro￿t function, we have:
P
￿
1(￿;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)






(2 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
2￿
2￿






(2 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
2￿
2￿
8See Appendix for the complete expression of the pro￿t function and other computation
details.
21Finally, substituing ￿￿ = 0:43 and ￿ = ￿1 in the above equation and in
equation (19)&(20) we ￿nd P ￿




However, if ￿rms decide not to share their pro￿ts, that is, ￿￿ = 0 and
￿ = ￿1, we ￿nd P1 = 23:6
Conclusion: For ￿ ￿ ￿1, (￿1, ￿2) : ￿￿




￿i 2 [0;1] are SPNE of the game. Besides, pro￿ts in the SPNE is 12% higher
than in the case where ￿1 = ￿2 = 0, making it rewarding for ￿rms to share
pro￿ts.
8 Conclusion
This paper has shown how two ￿rms in a duopoly market may be able to
increase their pro￿ts and, in turn, to limit the competition through the pro￿t-
sharing strategy, and identi￿ed the direct and indirect e⁄ects of such a strat-
egy. Using di⁄erent oligopolistic models, we have brought to light when give
away pro￿ts could be a rewarding strategy for ￿rms.
There are many dimensions along which this simple model can be im-
proved and extended. For instance, since ￿rms are not enforced by any
contract, one can wonder what will happen if a ￿rm stop unilaterally sharing
its pro￿t with its rival (while it itself keeps on receiving a part of its rival￿ s
pro￿t). Waddle (2005d) "Pro￿t Sharing Between Firms: IV. A Win-Win
Strategy" investigates such an opportunistic behavior.
Likewise, a number of concerns occurs from the fact that ￿rms￿success-
ful strategies have generally in￿ uenced other ￿rms outside the market. For
instance, subsequent pro￿ts might attract new ￿rms in the market, ready
to divide the cake. What should the incumbents do face to those eventual
entrants? Should they block them or accommodate them? In the latter case,
should they share their pro￿ts with those new arrivals? Waddle (2005b)
"Pro￿t Sharing Between Firms: II. The Bertrand Model" implicitly analyses
these issues.
Our ￿ndings have interesting implications for economic development pol-
icy. For instance, a government can give subsidies (airport tax cuts) to
airlines companies in order to attract tourists. Interestingly, some empirical
evidence shows an increase of tourists in cities with low-cost airlines.
229 Appendix
Proof of Propositions 4 & 5
The demand functions are:








Second stage of the game:
Maxp1 P1 = (1￿ ￿1)p1D1(p1;p2)+ ￿2p2D2(p1;p2) (1)
By replacing D1(p1;p2) and D2(p1;p2) by their values, we have:









































Now, we can ￿nd p1( ￿1; ￿2) and p1( ￿1; ￿2). Let us substitute p2 by its


















) 4(￿1 + ￿1)(￿1 + ￿2)p1+











and by factorizing, we have:
p￿












































Back to the equation (1), we have:






























By simplifying and rearranging the above equation, we have:




2 ￿ 3￿2 + 12￿1￿2 ￿ 2￿2
1￿2 + 9 ￿ 9￿1) (4)
and by analogy:




1 ￿ 3￿1 + 12￿1￿2 ￿ 2￿2
2￿1 + 9 ￿ 9￿2) (5)
First stage of the game




2 ￿ 3￿2 + 12￿1￿2 ￿ 2￿2
1￿2 + 9 ￿ 9￿1)
The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to ￿1 give:
dP1
d￿1 = 1











With ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿, we have:
dP1
d￿1 = 1




2 (4￿3 ￿ 10￿2 + 8￿ ￿ 1) t
(2￿￿1)2(2￿￿3) = 0
By solving the above equation, we ￿nd :
￿￿ = 15%
Now, we can evaluate the corresponding pro￿t. By replacing ￿1 = ￿2 =
￿￿ in the equation (4) , we ￿nd:
P ￿
1 = 1
2 (1 ￿ ￿) t
1￿2￿￿
By replacing ￿￿ = 15% in the above equation, we ￿nd P1 = 60%
However, if ￿rms decide not to share their pro￿t, that is, ￿ = 0, we ￿nd
P1 = 50% t.
Proof of Propositions 6 & 7
The inverse demand functions are:
p1 = 1 ￿ q1 ￿ ￿q2 (1)
p1 = 1 ￿ ￿q1 ￿ q2 (2)
Second stage of the game
Maxp1 P1 = (1￿ ￿1)p1q1+ ￿2p2q2 (3)
By replacing q1 and q2 by their values, we have:
Maxq1 P(q1;q2) = (1￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ q1 ￿ q2)q1+ ￿2(1 ￿ q1 ￿ q2)q2
The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to q1 give:
25@P1
@q1 = 0
) (1￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ 2q1 ￿ ￿q2)￿ ￿2￿q2 = 0
) 2(1￿ ￿1)q1 = (1￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿(1￿ ￿1+ ￿2)q2 (4)








Using (5) and (6), we can ￿nd q1( ￿1; ￿2) and q2( ￿1; ￿2)
2(1￿ ￿1)q1 = (1￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿(1￿ ￿1+ ￿2)
(1￿￿2)￿￿(1￿￿2+￿1)q1
2(1￿￿2)
4(1￿ ￿1)(1￿ ￿2)q1 = 2(1￿ ￿1)(1￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿(1￿ ￿1+ ￿2)(1￿ ￿2)
+￿2(1￿ ￿1+ ￿2)(1￿ ￿2+ ￿1)q1
q￿





2( ￿1; ￿2) =
(1￿￿1)(2(1￿￿2)￿￿(1￿￿2+￿1))
4(1￿￿1)(1￿￿2)￿(1￿￿1+￿2)(1￿￿2+￿1) (8)
Finally, by replacing q￿
1( ￿1; ￿2) and q￿
2( ￿1; ￿2) by their value in (1) and
(2), we ￿nd easily:
p￿




2( ￿1; ￿2) =
2(1￿￿)(1￿￿1)(1￿￿2)￿￿2￿1(1￿￿1+￿2)+￿(1￿￿1)(1￿￿2+￿1)
4(1￿￿1)(1￿￿2)￿￿2(1￿￿1+￿2)(1￿￿2+￿1) (10)
Using the equations (5)-(8), we can write the pro￿t function:
P1( ￿1; ￿2) = (1￿ ￿1)p￿q￿
1+ ￿2p￿q￿
2 (11)










First stage of the game:





The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to ￿1 give:
dP1
d￿1 = 0
f(￿2￿2 (2a1 ￿ ￿2) + (1 ￿ ￿2)(￿￿a2 ￿ 2a1 ￿ 2a1￿))
((1 ￿ ￿2)(2(1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2))) + (1 ￿ ￿2)(￿2 + ￿)
((1 ￿ ￿1)(2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2￿2 (1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)))
+(￿2 (￿2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ (￿2 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2) ￿ ￿2￿1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)))
((1 ￿ ￿1)(2(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1)))
+(￿2(1 ￿ ￿2) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2) ￿ ￿1￿ (1 ￿ ￿1))
(￿2 (2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2￿1 (1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1)))g
(4(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1))
2
￿4(4(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1))(￿2(1 ￿ ￿2) + ￿2 (￿1 ￿ ￿2))
f((1 ￿ ￿1)(2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2￿2 (1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)))
+((1 ￿ ￿2)(2(1 ￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)))
+(￿2 (￿2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ (￿2 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2) ￿ ￿2￿1 ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿1)))
((1 ￿ ￿1)(2(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1)))g = 0




27) (￿2￿2 + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿3a￿ ￿ 2a))(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ 2a ￿ ￿)+(1 ￿ ￿)
2 (￿2 + ￿) ￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ ￿2￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
+
￿2 (￿2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ 2a ￿ ￿)(￿2 + 2a + ￿ ￿ a￿ (1 ￿ ￿)) ￿
2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)












2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ ￿2￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ 2a ￿ ￿)
+ ￿(￿2(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿2￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))
(1 ￿ ￿)(2 ￿ 2a ￿ ￿) = 0
By solving the above equation, we ￿nd :
f￿ = 1g;f￿ = ￿g;
￿





￿ = 1 ￿ 1
2￿
￿
where ￿ is a root of:
(8￿4 ￿ 24￿2 + 16￿)Z9 + (￿24￿4 + 128￿2 + 32 ￿ 144￿ + 4￿3 + 4￿5)Z8
+(38￿4 ￿ 192 ￿ 2￿6 + 512￿ + 4￿3 ￿ 328￿2 ￿ 8￿5)Z7
+(￿960￿ + 528￿2 ￿ 56￿3 + 480 + 2￿6 + 3￿5 ￿ 32￿4 ￿ ￿7)Z6
+(1040￿ ￿ 2￿6 ￿ 640 ￿ 552￿2 + 112￿3)Z5+
(￿100￿3 + 14￿4 ￿ 3￿6 + 352￿2 + 480 + 6￿5 ￿ 632￿)Z4
+(￿￿7 + 156￿ ￿ 200 ￿ 9￿5 + 44￿3 ￿ 108￿2 ￿ 2￿4 + 5￿6)Z3+
(48 + 36￿ + 4￿5 ￿ ￿6 ￿ 14￿3 + 8￿2 ￿ 2￿4)Z2+
(7￿3 ￿ 16 ￿ ￿4 ￿ 6￿2 ￿ 28￿)Z + 8 + 2￿2 + 4￿ ￿ ￿3 (15)
An approximative solution of the equation (15) is9:
￿￿ = 50% and ￿ = ￿1
Now, we can evaluate the corresponding pro￿t. By replacing ￿1 = ￿2 =
￿ in the equation (12), we ￿nd:
P ￿







4(1￿￿)2￿￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2￿2a￿￿
4(1￿￿)2￿1
By replacing ￿￿ = 45% and ￿ = ￿1 in the above equation, we ￿nd
P ￿
1 = 5:5
However, if ￿rms decide not to share their pro￿t, that is, ￿￿ = 0 and
￿ = ￿1, we ￿nd P1 = 1
9We use "Mapple", a program integrated to "Scienti￿c Workplace" to solve this equa-
tion.
28Proof of Propositions 8 & 9
The inverse demand functions are:
p1 = 1 ￿ q1 ￿ ￿q2 (1)
p1 = 1 ￿ ￿q1 ￿ q2 (2)
Let￿ s solve the system of equations (1) and (2) by the Cramer method:
(1) ) q1 + ￿q2 = 1 ￿ p1
(2) ) ￿q1 + q2 = 1 ￿ p2
D = 1 ￿ ￿2
Nq1 = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p1 + ￿p2








1￿￿2(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p2 + ￿p1) (4)
The demand functions are:
q1 = 1
1￿￿2(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p1 + ￿p2) (3)
q2 = 1
1￿￿2(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p2 + ￿p1) (4)
Second stage of the game:
Maxp1 P1 = (1￿ ￿1)p1q1+ ￿2p2q2 (5)
By replacing q1 and q2 by their values, we have:
Maxp1 P1 = 1
1￿￿2 [(1 ￿ ￿1)p1(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p1 + ￿p2) + ￿2p2(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p2 + ￿p1)]
The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to p1 give:
@P1
@p1 = (1￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ 2p1 + ￿p2)+ ￿2￿p2 = 0













Solving equations (7) and (8), we can write:







) [4(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2(1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1)]p1 =
(1￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿)[2(1 ￿ ￿1) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)]
p￿





2( ￿1; ￿2) =
(1￿￿1)(1￿￿)[2(1￿￿2)+￿(1￿￿2+￿1)]
[4(1￿￿1)(1￿￿2)￿￿2(1￿￿1+￿2)(1￿￿2+￿1)] (10)
Using (3) and (4), we can ￿nd q1( ￿1; ￿2) and q2( ￿1; ￿2)
q1 = 1



































and by analogy, we have:
30q￿




Using the equations (9)-(12), we can write the pro￿t function



















First stage of the game:





The ￿rst-order conditions with respect to P1 give:
@P1
@￿1 = 0
) [(1￿ ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿)f[(1￿ ￿1)(￿4 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿(1￿ ￿1+ ￿2)]
[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿2)(1￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿(1 + ￿) ￿2(1￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2 ￿1 ￿2]
￿[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿2) + ￿2 ￿2](1￿ ￿1)[2(1￿ ￿1) + ￿(1￿ ￿1+ ￿2)]g
+ ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)f[￿2(1￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿(1￿ ￿2+ ￿1) + ￿(1￿ ￿1)]
[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿2)(1￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿(1 + ￿) ￿1(1￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿2 ￿1 ￿2]
￿2[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿2) ￿ 2￿(1 + ￿) ￿1 + ￿(1 + ￿) + ￿2 ￿2]
(1￿ ￿1)[2(1￿ ￿2) + ￿(1￿ ￿2+ ￿1)]g]
[4(1 ￿ ￿1)(1 ￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2(1 ￿ ￿1 + ￿2)(1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿1)]
2 (1 + ￿)
￿4[4(1￿ ￿1)(1￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2(1￿ ￿1+ ￿2)(1￿ ￿2+ ￿1)]
[￿2(1￿ ￿2) + ￿2( ￿1￿ ￿2)](1 + ￿)f(1 ￿ ￿)(1￿ ￿1)(1￿ ￿2)
[2(1￿ ￿1) + ￿(1￿ ￿1+ ￿2)]
[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿2)(1￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿2(1￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2 ￿1 ￿2]
+ ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿)(1￿ ￿1)[2(1￿ ￿2) + ￿(1￿ ￿2+ ￿1)]
[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿2)(1￿ ￿1) ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿2(1￿ ￿2) ￿ ￿2 ￿1 ￿2]g = 0
@P1
@￿1c￿1=￿2=￿ = 0 gives:
[(1￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)f[(1￿ ￿)(￿4 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿]
[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿)2 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿) ￿(1￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2 ￿2]
￿[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿) + ￿2 ￿](1￿ ￿)[2(1￿ ￿) + ￿]g
31+ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)f[￿2(1￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ + ￿(1￿ ￿)]
[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿)2 ￿ ￿(1 + ￿) ￿(1￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2 ￿2]
￿2[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿) ￿ 2￿(1 + ￿) ￿ + ￿(1 + ￿) + ￿2 ￿]
(1￿ ￿)[2(1￿ ￿) + ￿]g][4(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ ￿2]
2 (1 + ￿)￿
4[4(1￿ ￿)2 ￿ ￿2][￿2(1￿ ￿)](1 + ￿)f(1 ￿ ￿)(1￿ ￿)2
[2(1￿ ￿) + ￿][(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿)2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2 ￿2]+ ￿(1￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)[2(1￿ ￿) + ￿]
[(2 + ￿)(1￿ ￿)2 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿(1￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2 ￿2]g = 0












￿ = 1 + 1
2￿
￿
where ￿ is a root
of:
(8 + 8￿)Z5 + (￿52 ￿ 48￿)Z4 + (￿2￿3 + 106￿ + 128)Z3+
(6￿2 ￿ ￿4 + 9￿3 ￿ 110￿ ￿ 152)Z2 + (￿12￿2 + 88 + 54￿ ￿ 10￿3)Z
+3￿3 ￿ 20 + 6￿2 ￿ 10￿ (15)
An approximative solution of the equation (15) is10:
￿￿ = 43% and ￿ = ￿0:990 57
Now, we can evaluate the corresponding pro￿t. By replacing ￿1 = ￿2 =
￿ in the equation (14) , we ￿nd:
P1( ￿; ￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)





(2 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2￿2￿
+





(2 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ ￿ (1 + ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿2￿2￿
By replacing ￿￿ = 43% and ￿ = ￿0:990 057 in the above equation, we
￿nd P ￿
1 = 26:4
However, if ￿rms decide not to share their pro￿t, that is, ￿￿ = 0 and
￿ = ￿0:990 057, we ￿nd P1 = 23:6
10We use "Mapple", a program integrated to "Scienti￿c Workplace" to solve this equa-
tion.
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